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Abstract
While social relationships play an important role for individuals to cope with missing market
institutions, they also limit individuals' range of trading partners. This paper aims at under-
standing the determinants of trust at various social distances when information asymmetries are
present. Among participants from an informal housing area in Cairo we nd that the increase
in trust following a reduction in social distance comes from the fact that trustors are much
more inclined to follow their beliefs when interacting with their friend. When interacting with
an ex-ante unknown agent instead, the decision to trust is mainly driven by social preferences.
Nevertheless, trustors underestimate their friend's intrinsic motivation to cooperate, leading to
a loss in social welfare. We relate this to the agents' inability to signal their trustworthiness in
an environment characterized by strong social norms.
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ment.
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11 Introduction
In developing countries formal (market) institutions are typically weak or non-existent (Cox and
Fafchamps, 2008). It has been widely observed that transactions with strangers are rare, while
most transactions take place within the social network.1 Social networks reduce transaction costs
particularly through the provision of external enforcement mechanisms, such as monitoring and
social sanctions (e.g. Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Platteau, 1994). What is then the value of trading
with a socially close person relative to a stranger when external enforcement mechanisms are absent,
and what are its determinants?
To address these questions, we conducted an experiment in an informal housing area in the
Greater Cairo Region in Egypt whose residents strongly rely on their social relationships in their
everyday lives (e.g. Singerman, 1995; Hoodfar, 1997). While these relationships enable them to
cope with missing market institutions, they can also result in ineciencies. A possible source of
ineciency originates from the limitation in an individual's range of trading partners and thus the
fact that their social relationships determine, among other things, the extent to which goods are
available, insurance can be provided, or loans can be obtained. At the same time, low trust toward
non-group members, a common characteristic of strong social ties among kin and close friends
(Ermisch and Gambetta, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009), can further limit the opportunities
to obtain services and goods in the anonymous market.2 An important aspect in broadening the
residents' access to, for instance, nancial services is to understand the varied determinants of trust
toward outsiders and toward socially close persons. In general it is assumed that beliefs are easier to
change or inuence than preferences, which are viewed as xed over time and across environments.
If dierences in trust are mainly caused by greater unconditional kindness toward insiders, external
actors will face diculties in building up trust. If, instead, dierences in trust are essentially
driven by individuals' beliefs, promoting trust will boil down to signaling trustworthiness. An
understanding of the inuence of preferences and beliefs on individual decision making at various
social distances can thus provide valuable insights for the design of policy interventions. Through
our experimental design, we provide a framework to contribute precisely to this understanding.
In the experiment, we implemented a binary trust game using a within-subject design, i.e.
1Examples include mutual insurance (Fafchamps, 1992; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001), the access to goods and
services through reciprocal exchange (Kranton, 1996) and informal contract enforcement as exercised in rotating
savings and credit associations (Fafchamps, 1996; Karlan, 2005; Karlan et al., 2009).
2More general, low trust toward strangers is typical for collectivist countries, including most developing countries,
in which transactions mainly take place within groups and in which contract enforcement is informal (Greif, 1994).
2participants had to make two decisions out of which only one was implemented and paid. The
only dierence between the two decisions was the social distance toward the trading partner, i.e.
participants interacted with a direct friend (familiar situation) and a randomly chosen stranger
(unfamiliar situation).3 This allows us to investigate the determinants of trust and cooperation
in dierent situations for the same person, and hence to automatically control for heterogeneity
among participants.
We are especially interested in a situation in which monitoring or social sanctions are hardly
possible, since this mirrors the transition from relationship-based to anonymous market transactions
and constitutes a gateway for policy interventions. To capture the essence of such situations, we
add a hidden action element to the trust game, i.e. the trustor (principal) cannot fully observe the
action of the trustee (agent).4 If the principal places trust in the agent and the agent responds with
cooperation, there is a small probability that the agent's cooperative eort is lost and the principal
receives the betrayal payo. Therefore, whenever the principal gets a low payo she cannot be
certain about the agent's decision irrespective of the social distance between the two.
This is not necessarily an uncommon situation for principals in a social network. For
example, the eort of intermediaries who serve an important role for accessing goods and services
in networks is often not observable (Singerman, 1995). A principal cannot be sure whether her
middleman is occupied with helping others or whether he is willing to comply with her request. Also
agents' social status and the multiple interdependencies between principals and agents within the
network may impede the eectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. In such situations, transactions
will depend on the principal's information or knowledge about the agent's type, i.e. whether the
agent is trustworthy or not, as well as on his (social) preferences. Through the within-subject
design we can control for the latter, in particular for unobserved individual dierences, while the
introduction of hidden action in the trust game ensures that reduced social distance works only
through a reduction in information asymmetries and not through increased availability of extrinsic
enforcement mechanisms.
The emergence of trust is often related to the ability of agents to communicate their trust-
worthiness (e.g. Arrow, 1972; Fukuyama, 1996), such that principals can distinguish between good
3In previous experimental studies, the term \social distance" has been mainly used to describe changes in the
degree of anonymity either between participants and experimenter or between participants, for instance, by using
double-blind procedures, by providing certain information about the other (e.g. gender or last name) or by letting
participants meet before taking the decision. Homan, McCabe and Smith (1996, 1999); Bohnet and Frey (1999) are
good examples for dictator games.
4Trust games conducted in developing countries have so far examined trust toward strangers mostly using the
standard trust game design by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).
3and bad types. However, this ability might be particularly hampered in environments with strong
community norms, because they leave little leeway to incur an extra cost in order to signal trust-
worthiness. Also, if norms are internalized it is dicult to extract the motives behind benevolent
behavior and thus to learn about the intrinsic motivation of others within the network. To account
for norms of solidarity and reciprocity within the community, we conducted a series of dictator
games utilizing the same within-subject design as in the trust game. We modify the dictator games
by introducing role uncertainty. Thereby, we confront participants with the possibility of a posi-
tive or negative income shock. Participants in the role of the decision maker can respond to this
(positive) shock by transferring a part of their endowment to the recipient. Exposing decision
makers to recipients at dierent social distances (i.e. friend versus stranger) allows us to relate
the value of social relationships to community norms. In order to distinguish between dierent
motives for transfers, we implement two treatments: in the anonymous treatment, recipients do
not learn whether the amount was transferred to them by their friend or by a stranger, whereas
in the non-anonymous treatment, they receive this information at the end of the experiment. The
anonymous dictator game hence provides a measure of participants' solidarity, while we measure
participants' reciprocity in the non-anonymous dictator game due to possible future interaction.5
More recently, interest in the use of individuals' real-world social networks in experiments
has increased. Most related to our study are the papers by D'Exelle and Riedl (2008), Leider et al.
(2009), Goeree et al. (2010), and Bra~ nas Garza et al. (forthcoming), which run dictator games to
study prosocial giving in networks. Our study deviates from these studies in several respects.
First, our interest is not in studying prosocial giving, but in the eect of social distance on
trust and its determinants. Thus, we are mainly interested in the behavior in the trust game and
we complement this analysis with results from a series of dictator games to control for community
norms and for participants' social preferences in the analysis. Second, we draw on a dierent, highly
heterogeneous subject pool, residents of an informal housing area (Manshiet Nasser), who strongly
depend on their social network for survival (e.g. Singerman, 1995; Hoodfar, 1997). Except for the
study by D'Exelle and Riedl (2008) who collected their data from household heads in a village
in Nicaragua all other studies were conducted among students or pupils in Europe and the US.
Finally, we used a dierent procedure to access participants' real-world connections. We invited
participants and required that they take part in our experiment together with a friend. This mutual
5This approach was pioneered by Leider et al. (2009). In contrast to our setup, Leider et al. (2009) do not introduce
role uncertainty. They measure altruism in the anonymous treatment and future interaction eects in social networks
in the non-anonymous treatment.
4agreement to participate in the experiment ensured a two-sided link between friends and at the same
time determined the social distance of the relationship, which is usually dened as the path length
between trading partners (e.g. Jackson, 2008). According to this denition we rely on relationships
with the shortest possible path in a network, i.e. direct friends at social distance 1. Through our
within-subject design we are able to compare behavior resulting from an interaction with a direct
friend (familiar situation) with behavior in an unfamiliar situation in which the interaction takes
place with a randomly chosen stranger, i.e. at innite path length. In contrast, the aforementioned
studies used network elicitation tools to obtain detailed information about the social network of the
participants, also with the aim of analyzing additional questions, such as whether the content of
the network (D'Exelle and Riedl, 2008) or participants' position within the network (Goeree et al.,
2010) play a role. Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree et al. (2010) were further interested in dictator's
behavioral pattern for several social distances, i.e. including indirect friends. The advantage of
using network elicitation methods is that the experimenter can randomly draw one out of all direct
friends. However, in all the studies mentioned, participants were limited to fellow pupils, students,
and head of households, which might lead to an underestimation of the eect of social distance
on behavior. In contrast, our study does not restrict the set of friends out of which invitees could
choose, provided they were adults and not close family members. Somewhat similar is perhaps the
approach used in Glaeser et al. (2000). They were interested in the methodological question of the
predictability of trusting behavior by attitudinal survey questions in a standard trust experiment.
They vary the social distance of participants by allowing them to self-select into pairs upon arrival
and nd that knowing each other longer results in slightly more trust and trustworthiness.6
We nd that participants transfer a high share of their endowment to strangers (baseline
solidarity) and a majority of them split the endowment equally in the one-way anonymous setup.
This observed baseline solidarity varies little with individual characteristics suggesting a strong
norm of solidarity within the community. Despite the high level of baseline solidarity, close social
relationships are still of value: on average, transfers increase when the recipient is a friend. Transfers
are also larger when the veil of anonymity is lifted, i.e. reciprocation in future interaction plays a
role.
Participants' high level of solidarity is reected by agents' behavior in the trust game where
the main predicting variable for agents' probability to cooperate is their solidarity, regardless which
6They recruited students from an introductory economics class and allowed those who arrived together to play
together, thereby raising the likelihood that participants know each other.
5situation they face. The results of the trust game reveal that a reduction in social distance is also
associated with a signicant increase in trust. The driving force behind this increase in trust comes
from the fact that principals are much more inclined to follow their beliefs when interacting with
their friend. In the unfamiliar situation, it seems that principals are not condent about their beliefs
and, hence, their social preferences become more important. Nonetheless, in the familiar situation
principals base their decision on wrong expectations since, on average, principals' friends are much
more willing to cooperate than principals anticipate (72% versus 40%). Hence, they cannot fully
reap the potential benets from trust and cooperation. Estimation results suggest that principals
do not incorporate their friend's baseline solidarity when forming their beliefs.
Low investment rates in the Arab region have been mostly attributed to the tribal nature
of Arab societies that fosters trust only within limited boundaries and hampers it toward outsiders.
Consequently, as Bohnet, Herrmann and Zeckhauser (forthcoming) demonstrate, participants from
the Gulf are more betrayal averse than their Western counterparts and thus require higher prob-
abilities of trustworthiness in order to enter a trust relationship. Against this background, our
results are intriguing in that they suggest that strong social ties are not necessarily associated with
high trust among insiders, either.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some background
information about the eld setting and give an overview of the procedures along with a description
of the setup of the games. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the results
from the dictator game. In section 5, we analyze the determinants of trust and cooperation and
look more closely at individual friend pairs, in particular whether friends' expectations and behavior
match. Section 6 discusses some policy implications and concludes.
2 Research Design and Games
2.1 Background
We conducted our study in Manshiet Nasser, one of the largest and oldest informal housing areas in
Cairo. Manshiet Nasser is a squatter settlement built on government-owned land. Its location along
the limestone clis of the Mokattam plateau and its dicult accessibility challenge any upgrading of
basic infrastructure like water supply or sewage disposal. Living and environmental conditions are
poor. Population estimates range from 420,000 to almost 1 million inhabitants. While estimates
for Greater Cairo suggest a population density of around 40,069 per square kilometer (UNDP,
62005), this gure is likely to be higher for Manshiet Nasser and other informal housing areas given
the continued population growth and geographic limitations in expanding the area.7 The average
household size is 6 persons and more than 30% of the families live in one single room (UN-HABITAT,
2003). In comparison to many other informal housing areas in developing countries, violent crime is
a rare event. There is a low level of social engagement in Manshiet Nasser (UN-HABITAT, 2003).
The few active non-governmental organizations (NGOs) typically have some religious { Muslim or
Coptic { background.8 Other sources of activities are mostly informal savings associations, called
gam'iyyaat in the Egyptian dialect. They are frequently used to meet nancial needs, such as
funeral or marriage costs (Singerman, 1995; Hoodfar, 1997).
Particularly in the informal housing areas, religion has come to play an important role in
people's everyday lives. On the one hand, this is due to many residents originating from the more
traditional, rural areas in Upper Egypt. On the other hand, and more importantly, the lack of
formal institutions has opened up room for religious organizations to provide basic services to the
people (Singerman, 1995). In recent years, for example, taking the veil has become a must for
Muslim women while in the 1980s only very few women did so (Hoodfar, 1997). Gender roles are
well-dened and compliance to Muslim norms and values is closely monitored (Bibars, 2001).
2.2 Procedure
Conducting a eld experiment in a highly religious environment poses several challenges. The
most important limitation was the fact that gambling is forbidden in Islam. We therefore refrained
from additionally conducting a risk game in order to control for risk preferences in the trust game
through an experiment (see section 3). We paid great attention to the choice of the recruiters,
the instructor and the assistants (see below), as well as to the language used when announcing
the experiment and during the experiment itself (see Appendix for the experimental procedures).
In the timing and duration of the experimental sessions (workshops) we took further care that
participants would not miss prayer times.9
We employed three local female assistants for the recruitment of participants. By using
female recruiters we wanted to facilitate the recruitment of female participants. We provided
recruiters only with some general information about the study. They were not aware of the purpose
7According to the 2006 Census, the population of Greater Cairo amounts to 18 million. Recent estimates suggest
that more than 40% of the population of Greater Cairo live in informal housing areas.
8Estimates on the share of the Coptic population in Egypt range between 5% to 15%.
9There is some exibility on prayer times as long as a missed prayer is completed before the next one is scheduled.
7of the study nor did they know the game protocol or procedure. The recruiters invited pairs of
friends, i.e. each invited participant (invitee) had to bring a friend. The invitee was told that
participation in the workshop was only possible together with a friend.10 In total, 144 slum dwellers
from all 9 districts of Manshiet Nasser participated in our study.
The participants are quite heterogeneous with respect to their socio-economic status, which
is common for informal housing areas in Cairo, see Table 1. Educational attainment varies sub-
stantially among participants, ranging from illiterates (30% of our sample) to university graduates
(10%). We also observe much heterogeneity related to age. Younger people in our sample typi-
cally have more education than older people, which reects Egypt's eorts over the last decades
to improve and expand the educational system. Only 9% of the illiterate participants are younger
than 25. More than 60% of our sample spent some time of their life outside Manshiet Nasser. This
fraction is higher for participants above the median age of 27. The average household in our sample
comprises of 6 members and has 3 rooms available. About 40% of the participants receive a regular
monthly waged income with an average monthly income of 377 Egyptian pound (L.E.), which is
equivalent to about 74 US$.11 Despite this heterogeneity in terms of socio-economic background
characteristics, friend pairs exhibit very similar characteristics with regard to age, schooling, em-
ployment status and wealth. All our friend pairs are same-sex pairs, which reects the strong
gender roles in Egypt. Many see each other on a daily basis and have known each other for many
years.
We conducted ve sessions with 24 to 30 participants within a week in May 2008. The
sessions took place in the late afternoon at a cultural theater located in one of the central districts
of Manshiet Nasser. It provided enough rooms and space to run the experiment, which is rare in
Manshiet Nasser due to the lack of public infrastructure and space. The sessions were run by a
female instructor, supported by a large group of assistants both male and female.12 The instructor
and the assistants received extensive instructions and training before the experiment.
Upon arrival, participants could only register together with a friend. After the registration,
they received a folder that contained three large envelopes with the material for the three tasks
and the questionnaire as well as 5 L.E. as a show-up fee for arriving on time. The show-up fee
was announced beforehand by the recruiters and had the purpose of strengthening our credibility.
Participants were not allowed to open the folder. Invitees and their friends were then seated
10The only restriction was that we did not allow direct family members and minors to participate.
11At the time of the study, the exchange rate was about 1 Egyptian pound (L.E.) for 0.19 US dollar.
12We also employed several Coptic assistants.
8Table 1: Participants' Characteristics.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 144 53%
Muslim 144 94%
Born in Manshiet Nasser 144 39%
Age 144 30 11 17 64




Nr of children 64 3 2 1 8
Nr of siblings 144 5 2 0 10
Nr of persons per household 144 6 2 1 11
Rooms per household 144 3 1 1 6
Volunteer in NGO 144 29%
Wage income (in L.E.) 59 377 263 70 1690
at spaced intervals in the front and, respectively, in the back of a large room to prevent any
communication among friends. After a short introduction we required participants to give their
consent for the experiment and the survey.
Explaining the games to participants with dierent levels of education poses a challenge
and is time consuming. We addressed this challenge in several ways. The instructor read out aloud
the instructions to ensure that every participant was given the same information and to minimize
any educational advantage. Additionally, we illustrated the games on charts and demonstrated the
procedure in front of the participants. Relevant parts were repeatedly explained by the instructor.
Moreover, participants only learned about a game before they actually played it. This made it easier
for participants to understand the games and also ensured that participants could not condition
their behavior on subsequent tasks. There was no feedback about outcomes between the dierent
games. After explaining a game, the instructor went through several examples. We did not allow
any questions in public, but all participants could ask questions in private before playing a game.
For the decisions, a participant and a research assistant went to a predetermined place outside
the large room. If necessary, the research assistant explained the game once more or answered
questions. The participants made their decisions in private and handed the envelope with the
decision over to the assistant. Afterwards, participants were accompanied to their seat where they
waited for further instructions. During this time, participants were monitored by two assistants to
prevent any interaction among them.
9Each session started with the trust game followed by the two dictator games, a summing-
up and an interview-based questionnaire. The questionnaire contained questions on socio-economic
characteristics, such as sex, age, education, employment status, and household assets, as well as
questions on social and risk preferences and on characteristics of their relationship to the friend
with whom they participated in the workshop. When questions referred to a scale, the interviewers
showed smilies assigned to the upper and lower bound and, where applicable, to the mid point
with the aim of helping the less educated participants. All decisions were performed with coded
envelopes. During the entire experiment there was no interaction between participants and us. We
did not change the order of the trust game and the dictator game because it involved more eort
to explain the trust game and we wanted the participants' concentrated attention. However, we
did change the order of the dictator games and decisions. On average, participants earned a total
of 34 L.E. (approx. 6.5 US$ at the time of the experiment) which is twice a worker's daily wage.
2.3 Trust Game
We used a binary trust game with hidden action as depicted in Figure 1 (see also Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006). The principal can either trust or distrust her agent. If she trusts, the agent
can either betray or cooperate. In the latter case, there is a small chance (one-sixth) that the
cooperative eort is lost for the principal. Applying backward induction and assuming selsh and
risk-neutral participants, the \distrust" strategy with the sure outcome is the dominant strategy
(although it is Pareto-inferior) since the principal would expect the agent to maximize his payo
by choosing the betray option. On the other hand, if a sucient level of trust exists between
participants, they will choose the (trust, cooperate) strategy. This should be the case despite the
small chance of a low outcome for the principal. First of all, the expected payo of the principal
(assuming risk-neutrality) for this strategy is 20 2/3 L.E. which is strongly preferable to the distrust
strategy where the principal would receive only 10 L.E. Furthermore, we have chosen payos so
that the joint payo in case of bad luck is still greater than the joint payo in the distrust case
(24 L.E. versus 20 L.E.). So, provided both participants trust each other and given the trust game
is played in a non-anonymous setup, pairs could afterwards just split the 24 L.E. so that each of
them would be better o than if the principal had chosen to distrust in the rst place. What this
trust game nicely captures is the fact that economic exchanges often involve some moral hazard.
If the principal receives only 4 L.E., it is impossible for her to nd out whether the agent betrayed

































Figure 1: One-shot Binary Trust Game with Hidden Action for Agents (Payos in L.E., Egyptian
Pound.)
In the beginning of each session a coin was tossed to determine whether invitees or their
friends played the trust game as a principal. Since we expected a low level of trust, we implemented
the strategy method for agents. We thus obtain an observation for every agent. To determine the
success or failure in case of cooperation, the assistant drew one of six numbered cards after the
agent made her decisions. A success was determined by card numbers 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 and a failure
by card number 1. Each principal and each agent played the game twice, once in the familiar
situation interacting with a friend and once in an unfamiliar situation interacting with some other
randomly chosen person (\stranger") among the other group (invitees or friends).13 We explained
to participants at length that only one decision would determine their income and that the decision
would be randomly selected in public at the end of the session. Both decisions were made in a
non-anonymous setting, but we revealed the identities only ex-post. This means that participants
learned at the end of the session with whom they had played the game. After making their decisions,
participants were asked about their expectations about others' behavior for both decisions.
2.4 Dictator Game
In the second and third part of the experiment, participants played a dictator game. We modied
the dictator games by introducing role uncertainty. This uncertainty resembles a positive income
13We varied the order of the decisions between sessions.
11shock for a decision maker and negative income shock for a recipient, respectively. Transfers can
thus be interpreted as a mutual insurance against this shock, measuring an individual's solidar-
ity toward other community members, rather than an individual's altruism (see also Coate and
Ravallion, 1993). In each part a decision maker received two envelopes with 20 L.E. For the rst
decision, she had the possibility to allocate some or all of the 20 L.E. to her friend, and for the
second, to a stranger.14 The dictator games in the two parts diered with respect to the anonymity
of the decision maker. In the non-anonymous treatment (DGNA) the recipient learned ex-post the
identity of the decision maker, while in the anonymous treatment (DGA) she did not. After the
DGNA, we additionally asked decision makers why they had chosen that particular amount and
what amount they would expect from their friend and, respectively, from some other person. Due
to the role uncertainty each participant played the role of the decision maker and the role of the
recipient. Thus, we had 144 decision makers, each making two decisions in the DGNA and two
in the DGA. We paid participants either for their role as a decision maker or as a recipient and
only for one decision per treatment (friend or stranger). We determined the role and the relevant
decision for each treatment before the game was played but we revealed it only at the end of the
session. To ensure anonymity in the DGA treatment, we determined only the role and not the
payment-relevant decision. Analogous to Leider et al. (2009), in the anonymous dictator game we
label the amount given to a stranger as \baseline solidarity" and the amount given to their friend
\directed solidarity".15 In the non-anonymous dictator game, we measure reciprocity due to the
possibility of future interaction and enforcement.
3 Empirical Strategy
We now outline our empirical strategy to explore the determinants of trust and cooperation. Uti-
lizing our within-subject design, we are particularly interested in whether the role of participants'
preferences and beliefs in economic exchanges changes following a reduction in the social distance
between them and their trading partners.16 Following Coleman (1990) we adopt a behavioral def-
inition of trust. Hence, the essence of trust is that a principal places something valuable at the
14As in the trust game, we varied the order of the decisions between sessions.
15Leider et al. (2010) refer to the amount a decision maker gives to a nameless person as \baseline altruism" and
the additional amount given to a friend as \direct altruism", thereby assuming that these amounts are additively
separable. In order to allow for the possibility that these amounts are partial substitutes, we label the entire amount
given to the friend as directed solidarity.
16Naef et al. (2009) show that dierences in preferences and beliefs can explain most of the trust gap between the
US and Germany. Note that they draw on a between-subject design.
12disposal of the agent with the belief that the other will not misuse it.17 Given this behavioral de-
nition of trust and given that we measure trust through an experiment, participants' social and risk
preferences should not aect beliefs about others' trustworthiness but should directly aect trust
behavior (Fehr, 2009). We estimate the following binary choice models for principals' propensity
to trust and, respectively, for agents' propensity to cooperate:
Trusti = 1Expi + 2SocPrefi + 3RiskPrefi + 4Neti + 5Friendshipij + 6Xi + i (1)
Cooperatei = 1SocPrefi + 2RiskPrefi + 3Neti + 4Friendshipij + 5Xi + i (2)
where Exp refers to principal i's expectation that the agent { her friend j or some stranger {
will choose to cooperate, i.e., to reward her trust. SocPref encompasses measures for social,
other-regarding preferences and RiskPref is an indicator for risk preferences. Net stands for char-
acteristics of the principal's (general) social network while Friendship captures variables describing
the relationship to her friend j. Finally, X represents individual characteristics, such as sex, age
and years of schooling.18
To capture social preferences we include the transfer to a stranger and to the friend in the
anonymous dictator game, i.e. baseline and directed solidarity. We complement this measure with
a dummy variable indicating whether the participant volunteers for a non-prot organization, i.e.
a measure of altruism, and the frequency of lending money to friends (never, once or several times
per year, or once a month or more). We anticipate observing a positive relationship between each
of these variables and both trust and cooperation (e.g. Castillo and Carter, 2002; Ashraf, Bohnet
and Piankov, 2006).
In order to measure risk we have to rely on attitudinal questions that were asked in the
post-experimental questionnaire. Ideally, we would have liked to elicit risk attitudes through actual
behavior in a risk game (see e.g. Schechter, 2007; Bohnet, Herrmann and Zeckhauser, forthcoming).
We abstained from doing so since such a game could be associated with gambling, which is strictly
forbidden in Islam (see section 2). We asked participants about their risk attitudes in general as
well as with respect to nancial aspects and to people.19 Admittedly, such risk measures might
17Alternatively, a purely belief-based trust denition would dene trust as an expectation about trustworthiness
and would not require a trusting act, i.e. placing something valuable at others' disposal.
18Note that the binary choice model for agents' decision to cooperate does not include expectations since we applied
the strategy method.
19The questions are taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Participants were asked to answer
the following questions on an 11-point scale they were shown by the assistant: \How do you see yourself: Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?" as well as \People can
13perform poorly in this context as it requires some level of abstraction and the level of education of
our participants was low. Nevertheless, it should give us at least a proxy of the risk attitudes of
our participants.20 The literature provides mixed evidence about the inuence of risk attitudes on
trust behavior (see e.g. Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Karlan, 2005; Schechter, 2007; Houser, Schunk and
Winter, forthcoming). For instance, Schechter (2007) nds a positive impact of risk on trusting
behavior for rural villagers in Paraguay whereas Houser, Schunk and Winter (forthcoming) nd that
risk preferences, albeit explaining behavior in a risk game, have no explanatory power in the trust
game. We also control for risk preferences in agents' decision to cooperate because of the chance
move following cooperation. Agents who are very risk averse might try to avoid being confronted
with the chance move and are therefore more likely to choose \betray".
Network statistics provide information about an individual's wider social network irrespec-
tive of a particular relationship (see also Glaeser et al., 2000; Karlan et al., 2009). We include the
number of close friends besides family members and a dummy if the rst two sources of borrowing
money are family members and close friends. We assume that having few close friends and borrow-
ing money primarily from friends and relatives are proxies for strong social ties. Following Ermisch
and Gambetta (2008) and Alesina and Giuliano (2009), we expect that this is associated with a
lower probability to trust strangers and a higher probability to trust friends. Similarly, strong
social ties are likely to be associated with lower reciprocity toward strangers compared to friends.
Additionally, we control for the participant's perception of her immediate neighborhood as a proxy
for her embeddedness in the community (see also Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). If participants
perceive their neighbors as strangers they are more dependent on their network, fostering trust
toward friends and diluting trust toward strangers.21
While all friends brought to the workshop are direct friends with two-sided links, we nev-
ertheless want to assess possible dierences in the quality of the relationship. For instance, it is
possible that some participants are forced into a particular relationship because of existing group
ties, geographic proximity or someone's value for accessing certain goods and services. If this is
behave dierently in dierent situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas:
(a) nancial matters, (b) faith in other people". The 11-point scale ranges from trying to avoid risks (\0") to fully
prepared to take risks (\10").
20Dohmen et al. (2005) have shown for a representative German sample that these risk questions predict actual
risk behavior in experiments pretty well. Recently, Hardeweg, Menkho and Waibel (2009) validated the same risk
questions with a representative subsample of a panel survey in rural Thailand. They show that the general risk
question as used in this study correlates with behavior in a risk game. However, the relationship is stronger for better
educated participants.
21Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) suggest that trust is inuenced by how long an individual has lived in a community.
We therefore alternatively used a dummy for being born in Manshiet Nasser. However, it does not signicantly aect
trust and cooperation.
14Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Dictator Game.
treatments
anonymous (DGA) non-anonymous (DGNA)
social distance
stranger 7.29 (3.55) 7.90 (3.10)
friend 8.85 (3.12) 9.21 (2.60)
Notes: Amount given to the friend/stranger in each treatment (out of 20 L.E.).
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. N = 144.
the case, we would observe dierent behavior depending on the authenticity of the relationship.
We include the following two dummy variables: whether friends meet daily and whether they have
known each other for more than four years. The two measures give us a proxy for the intrinsic value
of the relationship, information exchange and for learning about each other's type (Homans, 1950;
Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006). Hence, we expect higher trust and cooperation among friends with
more frequent interactions and long-term relationships. Both intuitions also have a long-standing
game theoretical foundation (e.g. Kreps et al., 1982; Kranton, 1996; Karlan et al., 2009).
4 The Value of Relationships at Dierent Social Distances
In this section, we take a look at how social distance aects transfers in the dictator games as we
incorporate behavior revealed in the dictator games as possible determinants of trust and coopera-
tion in the empirical analysis of the trust game. The dictator games also provide us with a measure
of the strength of social norms in the community.
We have a total of 144 participants who made four allocation decisions each. The results
are shown in Table 2. On average, decision makers allocate 7.29 L.E. (36%) of the available 20
L.E. to a socially distant recipient (stranger) in the anonymous treatment. If decision makers can
direct the transfer toward a socially close person, i.e. a friend, transfers increase on average to 8.85
L.E. (44%). The loss of anonymity for decision makers leads to a further increase in transfers. If
the recipient is a stranger, decision makers allocate on average 7.90 L.E. (40%) to the recipient. If
instead the recipient is a socially close person, she receives on average 9.21 L.E. (46%). Compared
to the DGA, the social distance eect in the DGNA is slightly smaller (17% versus 22%). The
higher transfers in response to a reduction in social distance and to the loss of anonymity are each
15statistically signicant at the 99% and the 95% level, respectively.22 Note that the social distance
eect and the non-anonymity eect are substitutes (compare with Leider et al., 2010): the higher
the amount allocated to a friend relative to a stranger under anonymity, the less the decision maker
gives extra to her friend under non-anonymity.23 The variance of the amount given also changes
with respect to social distance and anonymity. It is smallest for friends in the NA treatment and is
statistically dierent from the variance in the anonymous treatment (variance ratio test; p = 0:03)
as well as from the variance of the amount given to a stranger in the NA treatment (variance ratio
test; p = 0:04).
The observed high shares of giving are similar to results for dictator games conducted in
other developing countries. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) provide an extensive overview of the
experimental evidence. They report an average allocation to strangers of about 38% in experiments
using a non-student subject pool. This is also consistent with evidence in the development eco-
nomics (Fafchamps, 1992) and in the anthropological literature (Sahlins, 1972; Singerman, 1995;
Hoodfar, 1997) on strong norms of solidarity and (\balanced") reciprocity among the poor as a
form of mutual insurance. These norms are explained by people's high exposure, or vulnerability,
to a variety of shocks, such as economic, environmental, and health shocks, against which they
often cannot formally insure and typically have limited resources to cope with (Fafchamps, 1999).
The high level of solidarity is the main dierence to studies in Western cultures and also
explains the larger dierence between transfers to friends and strangers in these studies, see e.g.
Leider et al. (2009), Goeree et al. (2010), or Bra~ nas Garza et al. (forthcoming). These studies
nd that decision makers increase their giving between 36% to 52% if the recipient is a direct
friend instead of a stranger, even under anonymity. Similar to our study, D'Exelle and Riedl (2008)
observe a comparatively low increase of giving to direct friends of 18% among household heads in
rural Nicaragua. Additional evidence for strong social norms comes from participants' expectations.
In the DGNA, participants expect to receive 6.67 L.E. (sd = 2.99, N=144) from a stranger, which
is about 1 L.E. less than they themselves give on average. From a socially close person they expect
to receive 9.26 L.E. (sd = 2.66, N=144), slightly more than their average transfer.
In order to analyze how baseline solidarity is associated with transfers to the friend, we run
22In both, DGA and DGNA, running t-tests yield a p < 0:01 for the reduction in social distance. For the loss of
anonymity for strangers and friends the t-tests yield a p < 0:025.
23This can be demonstrated by running the following regression: NAEffecti = 1SDEffecti + 2Xi + i where
NAEffecti is the dierence between transfers to the friend in the anonymous and in the non-anonymous treatment
and SDEffecti is the dierence between transfers to a friend and a stranger in the DGA. The coecient 1 is
smaller than one and statistically signicant.
16Table 3: Determinants of the Transfer to a Friend in the Anonymous and Non-Anonymous Dic-
tator Game.
Decision makers' transfer to friend
DGA DGNA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline solidarity 0:570 0:548 0:246 0:239
(0:092) (0:100) (0:084) (0:089)
Baseline solidarity  0:074  0:020
(0:069) (0:040)
Decision maker's expectation 0:517 0:522
(0:121) (0:126)
Age 0:024 0:024 0:032 0:031
(0:021) (0:024) (0:016) (0:017)
Age 0:006 0:015
(0:030) (0:024)
Female 0:249 0:289  0:065  0:101
(0:412) (0:417) (0:298) (0:257)
Years of schooling 0:054 0:048 0:067 0:075
(0:081) (0:079) (0:041) (0:042)
Years of schooling 0:034 0:038
(0:039) (0:030)
Wealth  0:213  0:228  0:288  0:251
(0:417) (0:447) (0:198) (0:233)
Wealth 0:359  0:166
(0:535) (0:337)
N 144 144 144 144
R
2 0:43 0:44 0:57 0:57
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS regressions with standard errors reported in parentheses. In all specications,
standard errors account for clustering on the decision maker and recipient level (two-
way clustering). DGA refers to the anonymous dictator game, DGNA to the non-
anonymous dictator game. Wealth is an index calculated from participants' household
assets using factor analysis.  refers to the absolute dierence between decision maker
and friend characteristics of the respective variable.
17standard OLS regressions for both treatments, DGA and DGNA.24 We use the following model:
Givingi = 1Basei + 2EXPi + 3Xi + i (3)
where Giving is either decision maker i's transfer to the friend in DGA or DGNA. Base is the
decision maker's baseline solidarity and X represents individual characteristics such as age, sex and
years of schooling. For the NA treatment, we additionally include the decision maker's expectation
about his friend's level of giving in the DGNA, EXP. In a second specication, we also control
for dierences between the characteristics of decision makers and their friends. Since a decision
maker i is asked to make a transfer to her friend j and, vice versa, her friend j is asked to make
a transfer to i, E[i;j] 6= 0, that is the error terms of each friend pairing are correlated. In order
to correct standard errors, we apply a two-way clustering as proposed by Miller, Cameron and
Gelbach (2009). The results are displayed in columns (1) to (4) in Table 3.
In both treatments, the transfer of decision makers to their friend is largely determined by
their baseline solidarity. A one-unit increase in their baseline solidarity is associated with a 0.57
unit increase in the transfer in the DGA (column 1). In the DGNA, the coecient is smaller (0.25
and 0.24, respectively) as the decision makers' transfer is strongly determined by their expectations
about their friends' norm of reciprocity. As mentioned earlier, given the comparatively low level
of baseline solidarity, studies on social networks in Western societies found considerably larger
increases (e.g. Leider et al., 2009). A larger dierence in baseline solidarity between the decision
maker and her friend reduces directed giving. The coecient is, however, not signicant. Individual
characteristics of the decision maker and her friend have no inuence on transfers. The fact that
individual characteristics have little eect on the allocation decision in the dictator game has also
been observed by other studies (D'Exelle and Riedl, 2008; Goeree et al., 2010).
In sum, we observe a high level of solidarity among our participants. Nonetheless, social
distance signicantly aects transfers emphasizing the value of close social relationships.
18Figure 2: The Eect of Social Distance on Behavior in the Trust Game.
5 How a Reduction in Social Distance Aects Trust and Cooper-
ation
5.1 Determinants of Trust and Cooperation
Figure 2 presents the aggregate results of the trust game. Only 17 out of 72 principals (24%)
opted for trust when confronted with a stranger. The trust rate increases substantially to 40%
(29 out of 72) when confronted with a socially close person. Agents, on the other hand, seem
reluctant to cheat even though principals cannot observe their actions. Nevertheless, agents are
also sensitive toward decreased social distance. The cooperation rate of agents increases from 55%
when confronted with a stranger to 72% when interacting with a socially close person.25 Reduced
social distance also leads to eciency gains. In the unfamiliar situation, only 7 out of 72 pairs
(10%) succeed in implementing the (trust, cooperate) outcome compared to 20 pairs (28%) in the
24Our results are very similar when we run the regressions using a standard Tobit model.
25Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) provide a survey of trust experiments in developing countries. Compared to
students in industrialized countries, trust toward strangers is typically low in developing countries, a nding that is
overall in line with the literature on strong social ties. It also seems that trustworthiness is higher for non-student
populations. Note that all surveyed experiments used a standard trust game and a direct comparison of the results
is not warranted.
19familiar situation. Interestingly, we nd a rather wide gap between trust and cooperation: Whereas
on average only 40% of the principals opt for \trust", 72% of all agents opt for \cooperate". We
come back to this in section 5.2.
Estimation results for principals' propensity to trust and agents' propensity to cooperate
are presented in Tables 4 and 5 (for a detailed explanation of the underlying empirical models see
section 3). Using the fact that we have two decisions for each principal and each agent { i.e., one
for each pairing { we display marginal eects from estimating random eects probit models with
robust standard errors in the rst four columns. The dummy variable \paired with friend" refers to
the familiar situation, i.e. it measures the eect of a decrease in social distance on an individual's
decision. Note that expectations as well as the amount given in the DGA dier by pairing; all
other variables do not change. In the last three columns we report marginal eects from separate
regressions for strangers and friends.
The estimates from the rst four models in Table 4 provide a clear picture. Principals
trust socially close persons signicantly more than strangers and this is mainly driven by their
expectations. In the third and fourth model, we additionally control for risk and social preferences
as well as for individual characteristics.26 We nd some evidence that social preferences matter.
Principals who show more solidarity in the dictator game tend to place more trust in agents, but
this is not statistically signicant. The frequency of lending money and volunteering signicantly
increase the likelihood of trust. Risk preferences seem to have no impact. Alternative measures
for risk, such as the responses given to the other two risk questions (see section 3) or a dummy for
self-employment, do not change results.
The models in columns (5) and (6) show that expectations do not signicantly aect prin-
cipals' trust in strangers while they signicantly and strongly aect trust in friends, i.e. principals
who expect a cooperative behavior of their friend are 46% to 48% more likely to opt for trust. The
results further suggest that the decision to trust a stranger is mainly inuenced by social prefer-
ences. Both the frequency of lending money and volunteering signicantly increase the probability
that principals trust a stranger and the coecients for baseline solidarity, volunteering and lending
money are jointly signicant.27 In the last column, we additionally control for dierences in the
type of relationship among our friend pairs. However, neither coecient is statistically signicant.
Overall it seems plausible that principals' social (and risk) preferences weigh more heavily
26Including additional variables to control for invitees and wealth levels do not change the results.
27A Wald test is signicant at the 95 percent level. The same test is not signicant for the friend pairing (p > 0:33).
20Table 4: Determinants of Principals' Behavior in the Trust Game.
Principals' decision to trust
panel-I panel-II panel-III panel-IV stranger friend-I friend-II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Paired with friend (d) 0:204 0:223 0:215 0:214
(0:082) (0:083) (0:085) (0:085)
Principal's expectations (d) 0:273 0:302 0:301 0:135 0:479 0:462
(0:092) (0:093) (0:096) (0:102) (0:113) (0:120)
(Baseline/directed) solidarity 0:009 0:009 0:001 0:011 0:011
(0:015) (0:015) (0:014) (0:019) (0:020)
Volunteer (d) 0:201 0:264 0:199 0:185 0:179
(0:120) (0:133) (0:125) (0:128) (0:131)
Frequency of lending 0:118 0:118 0:172 0:031 0:027
(0:066) (0:069) (0:071) (0:084) (0:086)
Risk preferences  0:003  0:002  0:008 0:006 0:009
(0:015) (0:015) (0:014) (0:020) (0:019)
Close friends (#)  0:007  0:011  0:012
(0:005) (0:007) (0:007)
Borrowing within network (d)  0:068 0:111 0:125
(0:109) (0:145) (0:139)
Neighbors like strangers (d)  0:135 0:263 0:269
(0:089) (0:144) (0:143)
Daily visits (d)  0:079
(0:143)
Long-term relation (d)  0:100
(0:123)
Controls No No No Yes No No No
N 144 144 144 144 72 72 72
Pseudo R
2 0:15 0:21 0:22
(d) marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Marginal eects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses from estimating random eects
and simple probit models for the probability that the principal opts for trust. Frequency of lending money
is a categorical variable (never, once/several times per year, or once per month or more). Risk refers to
an 11-point scale ranging from trying to avoid risks (\0") to fully prepared to take risks (\10"). Controls
include age, sex and years of schooling of individuals as well as dummies for household head and born in
Manshiet Nasser.
21Table 5: Determinants of Agents' Behavior in the Trust Game.
Agents' decision to cooperate
panel-I panel-II panel-III panel-IV stranger friend-I friend-II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Paired with friend (d) 0:221 0:114 0:124 0:117
(0:089) (0:092) (0:093) (0:094)
(Baseline/directed) solidarity 0:061 0:056 0:054 0:066 0:067 0:072
(0:017) (0:018) (0:018) (0:019) (0:022) (0:022)
Volunteer (d) 0:076 0:007  0:067 0:142 0:169
(0:119) (0:139) (0:140) (0:090) (0:086)
Frequency of lending 0:008 0:038  0:062 0:038 0:065
(0:070) (0:073) (0:088) (0:066) (0:067)
Risk preferences 0:009 0:009 0:020  0:008  0:015
(0:015) (0:015) (0:018) (0:015) (0:015)
Close friends (#)  0:004 0:005 0:004
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002)
Borrowing within network (d)  0:128 0:161 0:098
(0:127) (0:112) (0:112)
Neighbors like strangers (d) 0:251 0:272 0:285
(0:128) (0:088) (0:084)
Daily visits (d) 0:228
(0:113)
Long-term relation (d) 0:111
(0:105)
Controls No No No Yes No No No
N 144 144 144 144 72 72 72
Pseudo R
2 0:16 0:25 0:31
(d) marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Marginal eects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses from estimating random eects
and simple probit models for the probability that the agent opts for cooperate in the binary trust game.
Frequency of lending money is a categorical variable (never, once/several times per year, or once per month
or more). Risk refers to an 11-point scale ranging from trying to avoid risks (\0") to fully prepared to
take risks (\10"). Controls include age, sex and years of schooling of individuals as well as dummies for
household head and born in Manshiet Nasser.
22in the decision-making process when uncertainty about the agent's behavior becomes high, i.e.
when principals face diculties in forming expectations about the agent's behavior. A reduction
in social distance between trading partners, on the other hand, leads to a reduction in information
asymmetries and thus to higher trust.
The estimation results for modeling agents' decision to cooperate are shown in Table 5.
Without controlling for other factors, the magnitude of the friend dummy is nearly the same as
in Table 4 and signicant. The second and third column suggest that cooperation is strongly
correlated with solidarity, i.e. the amount given in the DGA. Each additional Egyptian pound
given in the DGA increases the probability to opt for cooperate by about 6% on average. This is
in line with other evidence, for example Castillo and Carter (2002) or Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov
(2006). Remember, however, that directed solidarity is signicantly greater than baseline solidarity
so that higher levels of cooperation in the friend pairing are reected by the higher amount given
to the friend relative to the stranger in the DGA. Other control variables, such as age and years of
schooling, do not have any signicant eect (column 4).
Looking at the results for the single regressions in the last three columns sheds more light
on the determinants of dierent cooperation levels in the stranger and friend case. Cooperation in
both the unfamiliar and the familiar situation is mainly driven by agents' solidarity. In the familiar
situation, additional variables aect agents' probability to cooperate. In line with our hypothesis,
strong social ties { proxied by the number of close friends { are associated with a higher probability
to cooperate with the friend. Moreover, cooperation is more likely among friends who see each
other daily.
5.2 Determinants and Accuracy of Principals' Expectations
The previous analysis suggests that trust between socially close persons is mainly driven by ex-
pectations. However, Figure 2 reveals two further interesting observations. First, on the aggregate
level principals' expectations are not sensitive to a change in social distance. Principals expect on
average a slightly less cooperative behavior from their friend than from a stranger (see Figure 2),
albeit this dierence is not statistically signicant (2
(1) = 1:01; p = 0:314). Second and relatedly,
there is a large gap in the familiar situation between principals' expected cooperation level and
agents' actual willingness to cooperate. While principals signicantly best respond more to their
expectations when confronted with a friend than with a stranger (2
(1) = 4:33; p = 0:037), expec-
tations are not more accurate in the familiar situation (2
(1) = 1:78; p = 0:182). Both observations
23indicate that the potential gains from trade are not fully realized.
Subsequently, we rst look at the determinants of principals correctly anticipating their
friend's behavior. Note that this is independent of whether the friend cooperates or not since
knowing the agent better may also result in expecting betrayal. For this, we regress the corre-
sponding binary variable on a set of individual characteristics of the principal, on a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the friend transferred a higher amount in the non-anonymous compared
to the anonymous treatment and on variables describing the quality of the friendship between the
two (for details about these variables see section 3). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 display the
results. As a robustness check we alternatively considered cooperative behavior only, see column
(3), but results hardly change. We nd that women have more accurate expectations about their
friend's behavior. This corresponds to the fact that women often organize and run informal sav-
ings groups called gam'iyyaat (Singerman, 1995), which requires a good assessment of people in
order to select reliable and trustworthy members. It is also in line with empirical evidence from
micronance programs and informal savings groups that women exhibit higher repayment rates
than men (Morduch, 1999; Anderson and Baland, 2002). Long-term relationships have a positive
and signicant eect on the accuracy of beliefs, too. This is consistent with economic models of
social interaction. More interaction is associated with a greater ow of information and a smaller
error in assessing the other. The accuracy of expectations is negatively aected if a friend displays
a non-anonymity eect in the dictator game, i.e. that a decision maker gives more to a friend if
transfers are observable (DGNA treatment). This suggests that principals have more diculties in
assessing the behavior of friends whose norm compliance is also motivated by extrinsic motivation.
High solidarity is associated with giving up a greater amount of money and thus this cost
can serve as a signal for trustworthiness (e.g. Camerer, 1988). Hence, if agents were successful
in signaling their trustworthiness, principals should { based also on our ndings in the previous
section { expect a higher willingness to cooperate from friends who show more solidarity. To test
this claim, we additionally regress principals' expectations on a set of individual characteristics of
both the principal and the friend, in particular we include the friend's directed solidarity, i.e. the
amount the friend allocated to the principal in the anonymous dictator game.28 Regression results
are presented in columns (4) and (5) in Table 6. They reveal that principals fail to incorporate
their friend's directed solidarity.
28We also tested whether risk and social preferences aect expectations. We found no impact and, therefore, do
not include them in the analysis. This is in line with Naef et al. (2009) and Fehr (2009).
24Table 6: Principals' Expectations in the Trust Game.
Principals' expectations
accuracy determinants
(1) (2) (3) 4 (5)
Age 0:007 0:009 0:006  0:003  0:008
(0:007) (0:007) (0:006) (0:007) (0:008)
Female (d) 0:311 0:343 0:333 0:262 0:288
(0:113) (0:122) (0:098) (0:113) (0:113)
Years of Schooling 0:003 0:000 0:007  0:005  0:020
(0:014) (0:015) (0:011) (0:013) (0:017)
Born in Manshiet Nasser (d)  0:192  0:344  0:292  0:127  0:052
(0:131) (0:136) (0:088) (0:125) (0:140)
Friend: higher transfer in DGNA (d)  0:345  0:239
(0:114) (0:067)
Accuracy of beliefs in DGNA 0:043 0:040
(0:025) (0:019)
Daily visits (d)  0:017 0:009
(0:143) (0:103)
Long-term relation (d) 0:364 0:218
(0:138) (0:109)
Friend: directed solidarity  0:025  0:031
(0:020) (0:020)
Friend: volunteer (d) 0:267
(0:151)
Friend: frequency of lending 0:061
(0:088)
Friend: risk preferences 0:018
(0:019)
Friend: close friends (#)  0:016
(0:007)
Friend: borrowing within network (d)  0:141
(0:132)
Friend: neighbors like strangers (d) 0:283
(0:145)
N 72 72 72 72 72
Pseudo R
2 0:12 0:22 0:30 0:08 0:20
(d) marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Marginal eects are reported from estimating probit models on the probability that principals' expectations
are correct and on the determinants of the probability that principals' expect cooperation. Columns (1)
and (2) report results independent from whether the principal correctly anticipated cooperation or betray
and column (3) reports results for correctly anticipating cooperation only. Variables are dened as before.
\Higher transfer in DGNA" refers to the transfer made in the DGA. \Accuracy of beliefs in DGNA" refers
to the absolute deviation between principals' expectation about the amount allocated to them by their
friend in the DGNA and the actual amount given. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
25What can explain principals' ignorance of their friend's intrinsic motivation? Cooperative
agents earned 20 L.E., which corresponds to one to two days' wages. Compared to this payo,
the additional gain from cheating (7 L.E.) was relatively small. This additional gain seems to
have been less tempting for agents than assumed by principals and, consequently, principals might
have underestimated their friend's intrinsic motivation to cooperate.29 In other words, principals
neglected the additional costs for agents that arise with betrayal, i.e. the intrinsic cost of violating
the norm of reciprocity and also the intrinsic cost of lying.30 These costs are possibly higher the
more frequent the interaction between friends. Indeed, the fact that daily interaction leads to more
cooperation could reect a higher intrinsic motivation not to cheat (see column 7 in Table 5).
Furthermore, results from the dictator game revealed that a reduction in social distance has
a positive and signicant eect on transfers and thus that relationships are valuable. Against this
background, it is all the more puzzling that principals were unable to anticipate agents' behavior,
and that they failed to realize that agents' decision in the trust game is similar to the reciprocal
exchange situation in the DGNA.31 The overall high solidarity and reciprocity among participants
might, however, also dilute any signal from agents so that principals cannot eectively distinguish
between good and bad types in their everyday life based on observed social preferences. The
underlying problem is, it seems, that in committed relationships even selsh individuals cooperate:
\Committed partners may often be assured of mutual cooperation, but this does not mean that
they trust each others's goodwill" (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994, p.135). If strong social norms
are present in the network, there is little need to learn about the trading partners' type. Extracting
this information in such an environment is also costly because there is not much room to obtain
such information. The diculty and disincentive to learn about the others' type in the network
leads to the low level of trust when enforcement mechanisms are absent as in the trust game. The
irony is that if principals expect their friend not to cooperate and thus abstain from a trusting
decision they will in turn never learn about the trustworthiness or type of their friends, either.
29A similar nding is reported in Leider et al. (2010) where recipients show quite an accurate assessment of decision
makers' giving across various social distances but systematically underestimate their baseline altruism.
30Anecdotal evidence and anthropological studies suggest considerable levels of mistrust even within the social
(kin) network. Singerman (1995) reports about a business owner who employed his two younger brothers to run the
shop. After a while, however, the owner realized that his brothers were taking out a greater share of the prots than
agreed upon. Lacking the possibility to sanction their behavior, he found himself monitoring his brothers in the shop.
Thus it might not be uncommon for principals to expect an agent, including a friend, to capitalize on a situation
with hidden action. Relatedly, Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2008) and Barr and Genicot (2008) nd that genetic
relatedness does not necessarily support enforcement based on intrinsic motivation.
31As agents were asked to assume a trusting principal, they may have felt obliged to reciprocate trust with cooperate
behavior. This would be consistent with a norm of \balanced reciprocity", which is a prevalent norm in this context
as discussed earlier.
26However, we also provided evidence that long-term relationships alleviate the assessment of good
and bad types. But, as with adapting preferences, this requires time.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study how the social distance between two trading partners inuences their
behavior in several exchange situations. The main insights from this paper are the following:
First, although reduced social distance signicantly increases giving in the anonymous and non-
anonymous dictator game, the increase { compared to ndings in developed countries (e.g. Leider
et al., 2009) { is small relative to the amount given to a stranger. Interestingly, reciprocity toward
friends is to a lesser extent associated with individuals' directed solidarity than with expectations
about the reciprocal behavior of their friend.
Second, even though principals cannot draw on informal enforcement mechanisms when
interacting with their friend, trust and cooperation among friends is higher than among strangers.
Similar to the results for reciprocity, we nd that the increase in trust is not driven by stronger social
preferences toward friends but by expected returns. On the contrary, dierences in cooperation
levels toward friends and strangers can be fully explained by dierences between agents' baseline
and directed solidarity. Put dierently, agents treat their decision problem similar to the one in
the dictator game and, consequently, behave in a similar way. Principals' behavior, on the other
hand, is neither related to their own level of solidarity, nor are expectations about their friend's
behavior very accurate. Their expectations are too low relative to agents' cooperation levels, since
they underestimate their friend's baseline solidarity. As a result, social welfare in the trust game
is lost.
We explain this gap between overall trust and cooperation among friends by the little
leeway strong social norms in these communities leave for agents to signal their trustworthiness.
These strong social norms of solidarity and reciprocity prevail since it is also benecial for selsh
agents to comply with these norms given that formal market institutions are weak or non-existent.
Complementary to this, principals nd themselves in a situation with little control over their friend's
decision due to the hidden action element in the trust game. They themselves cannot observe their
friend's behavior nor can they draw on their social network. As a result, many principals wrongly
refrain from trusting their friend.
Understanding the determinants of trust toward outsiders relative to socially close persons
27is important for decision makers in order to design successful policy interventions. The fact that
strong social ties are associated with low trust toward strangers can create a challenging envi-
ronment for policy makers, development agencies and NGO's previously unknown ('strange') to a
community. From the viewpoint of the community, on the other hand, the implementation of any
new development program is associated with various sources of uncertainties as agencies and their
employees are not subject to the enforcement mechanisms and norms adhered to in the community.
While our results indicate that strong norms within the community make signaling dicult among
friends, there might be more scope for external actors, such as development agencies. Credibility
seems crucial for trust building as well as true, measurable benets. Participants in our experiment
faced diculties in assessing, or believing in, others' goodwill whereas in a quid pro quo exchange,
they were willing to engage with a stranger and a friend in an almost equal manner. Thus, the
fact that external actors often promise benets without asking for anything in return may, while
well-intended, by itself cause distrust or suspicion. Interestingly, there is evidence that many Is-
lamic organizations in the informal housing areas which provide health care and other services do
require something in return, even if in a more indirect manner through requiring women to con-
form to Muslim norms and values, e.g. by taking the veil (Bibars, 2001). While women may not
be enthusiastic about this particular type of return, they may feel a sense of control about what is
exchanged in the transaction and can weigh one against the other.
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